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NOTES
were unreasonable, it is difficult to ascertain whether the court
gave great weight, some weight, or no weight to the consideration
that the orders prevented enforcement of the rate-fixing agree-
ment. Since the court clearly asserted that the Commission
was not bound by the agreement before it declared that the
contractual obligation had been impaired by the orders, it is
suggested that no weight was given this consideration.
While the court stated that the instant case was not a true
rate case but one dealing with the impairment of the obligation
of contract, it is submitted that the case was decided on the
misuse of state police power in fixing unreasonable rates.
The court evidently concluded that the 'Commission was acting
within its granted powers in ordering modification of rates,
but that in this instance the police power was exercised un-
reasonably because it forced the water company to operate at
a loss.11 The language in the decision pertaining to impair-
ment of the obligation of contract was unnecessary because the
court recognized that a contractual obligation is not a restraint
on the exercise of state police power. The result could have
been obtained by relying solely on rate regulation principles.
Further, it is conceivable that the language pertaining to the
impairment of the obligation of contract could lead to the
erroneous conclusion that municipal agreements on utility rates
can restrict the 'Commission's rate-fixing power. Manifestly,
such a conclusion is inconsistent with the well-settled principle
that the sole limitation on the Commission's rate-fixing power
is that it must be exercised in a just and reasonable manner.
Raleigh Newman
ADOPTION - REQUIREMENT OF RECORDATION
A succession proceeding raised the issue of validity of an
adoption of a major by the deceased, where the act of adoption
had not been properly recorded prior to the death of the adoptor.
The parties had executed a notarial act in compliance with the
statutory provisions but failed to record the instrument im-
17. It is suggested that the actual basis for the decision was that the water
company needed $28,500.00 additional annual revenue to pay for the added facilities
and the Commission's actions caused it to operate at an annual deficit of
$13,500.00.
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mediately. It was recorded a year later in the parish where the
parties were domiciled, but not until two weeks after the adop-
tor's death was it properly recorded in the parish where it was
executed. Held, the adoption of a major by a notarial act not
recorded as the statute requires, in the parish of execution,
before the adoptor's death is invalid. Succession of D'Asaro, 167
So.2d. 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
The primary consideration in this case is the proper inter-
pretation and application of the statute which provides in part:
"Any person above the age of twenty years may adopt
any person over the age of seventeen years according to the
following conditions, limitations and procedure:
"(1) That the adoption shall be effected by the execu-
tion of a notarial act signed by the adoptive parent or
parents and the person to be adopted....
"(2) That the notarial act executed in accordance with
paragraph (1) of this Section shall be registered with the
clerk of court of the parish in which the act is executed."'
(Emphasis added.)
It was argued that "effected" as used in the statute recognized
that the adoption was legally completed when the notarial act
was duly executed and that the last paragraph was a non-
essential provision to be performed after the legally effective
act of adoption had taken place. The court rejected this conten-
tion by stating: "All that is meant in the sense in which 'ef-
fected' is used is that the adoption shall be caused by the execu-
tion of a notarial act when followed by the requirements of
paragraph (2) with reference to registration." 2 The opposing
interpretation based upon a literal reading of that section seems
persuasive, and the court's reply does not appear to refute it.
The court further held that paragraph (2) was not merely
directory and reasoned that "if we were to uphold the purported
adoption in the instant case, we would in effect be accomplishing
a judicial repeal of that part of the statute requiring registra-
tion."'3 This drastic conclusion need not follow. The court could
have limited the holding to the facts of this case, i.e., that
whenever the act of adoption is in fact recorded, although
1. LA. R.S. 9:461 (Supp. 1963).
2. Succession of D'Asaro, 167 So.2d 391, 397 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
3. Id. at 396.
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improperly, and there is no suspicion of fraud, then the adoption
will be upheld unless third parties are prejudiced by the failure
of proper recordation.
The original act providing the present mode of adopting
persons over seventeen specified that such adoptions should
be invalid "unless all the essential provisions of this act have
been complied with."' 4 (Emphasis added.) In the preparation of
the Revised Statutes of 1950 the Reporter deliberately omitted
that language, stating as his reason that its inclusion was
simply "unnecessary." 5  In the 1952 amendment 6 of that act
the legislature did not reinstate the language described as
"unnecessary" but made certain other changes in the procedure.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the legislature also felt
such a provision to be unnecessary, in effect assenting to the
Reporter's implication that such provisions are tacitly written
into all such legislation. Had its intent been otherwise, the legis-
lature would have provided specifically that all requirements of
that statute must be met rather than merely accepting deletion of
the language requiring that essential provisions be followed.
Thus, it could be concluded that the legislature intended that
the essential provisions must be followed but that a failure to
meet a non-essential provision would not nullify the adoption.
The court did not consider this possibility, however.
Recordation is generally considered an incidental act in-
tended only to provide legal notice to third parties. Never
before, to the writer's knowledge, has recordation been held to
effect substantive rights between the parties to an act of adop-
tion. Yet this was the effect the court gave the registration
requirement in the instant case by holding the adoption null,
even between the parties, unless the act was recorded properly
and in time.
The legislative purpose (which the court did not consider)
for requiring the act of adoption to be registered in the parish
where it was executed is unclear. In earlier adoption legislation
the act of adoption was to be recorded in the parish where the
adopting party resided. 7  A later statute changed this and
stipulated that the adoption act be filed in the parish where
4. La. Acts 1940, No. 169, § 3.
5. See Reporter's Notes to LA. R.S. 9:461 (1950).
6. See LA. R.S. 9:461 (Supp. 1963), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 514.
7. La. Acts 1924, No. 109.
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it was executed, "provided that failure to so record any act
shall not invalidate the adoption."8  If the purpose of recorda-
tion is to give legal notice to third persons, it would seem that
requiring the act to be recorded in the parish where the adoptor
is domiciled would serve the function of providing notice better
than requiring the act to be recorded in the parish where it
was executed.9 A closer look suggests a query as to what third
persons need be given notice. The legal heirs are not regarded
as third persons in law.10 Only if the one adopted were not a
major (as he is in this case) would third persons ordinarily
have an interest in knowing of the adoption." Such thoughts
becloud any certain determination of the legislative purpose. A
possible answer to this is that the requirement of recordation
is intended to afford the parties to the act a means of preserving
that act as proof of the adoption, or to show that the parties
were of serious, non-fraudulent intent, rather than to provide
third persons with notice. If this be so, satisfaction of the
registration requirement certainly was not intended to be essen-
tial to the validity of the adoption.
Nevertheless, in the instant case there is even stronger reason
for upholding the adoption; for here there was in fact a registra-
8. La. Acts 1928, No. 13, § 2.
9. Third persons might check the records of the domiciliary parish of the
adoptor or adoptee, but they would hardly consider examining the records of every
parish to discover if there had been an adoption executed in some other parish.
10. See Porterfield v. Parker, 189 La. 720, 1.80 So. 498 (1938), where the
husband sold a community immovable, but the deed was not recorded until after
the death of the wife. The court held that the wife's heirs could not recover
the realty sold, stating: "Plaintiffs' mother was bound by the deed made by her
husband, although unrecorded, up to the moment of her death, and plaintiffs'
rights as heirs arose and were fixed at that moment. Plantiffs are not 'third
persons,' as that term is used in the Code." Id. at 722, 180 So. at 499. See also
Saunier v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So.2d 19 (1950), where the ex-husband
successfully defended an action by his former wife for alimony payments past
due to her and their children by pleading compensation. The court held that
compensation between the ex-husband and ex-wife could be effected in this
instance even though such compensation may abridge the rights of the children
of the marriage to alimony on the basis that "the two children are not third
persons within the meaning and contemplation of the article of the Code [article
2215] relied on." Id. at 619, 47 So.2d at 23. But see Quinette v. Delhommer,
176 So.2d 399, 406 (La. 1965), where the court recognized an exception to the
general rule that heirs are not considered as third parties, stating: "Article 2239,
however, has created an exception to the rule for forced heirs attacking the
simulated contracts of those from whom they inherit. When prosecuting such
an action, forced heirs do not stand in the shoes of their ancestor."
11. Only if the one adopted were a minor could his acts ever bind the adoptor,
thereby supplying an instance when some third party might have a definite
interest in knowing of the adoption. Otherwise creditors of the adoptor would
have no interest in the adoption until the death of the adoptor. At that time
it would be incumbent upon the adopted one to prove the adoption, and creditors'
rights become subject to such proof. -When their interest does accrue, they
may actively challenge or defend the adoption.
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tion with no suspicion of fraud, albeit in the improper parish,
and no one claimed injury from such a defect. Yet the heirs
were permitted to reap profit from a technical irregularity and
to divest the adopted son of the rights the deceased intended
him to have.
The basis of the court's decision was that adoption statutes
are to be complied with strictly in every particular before the
adoption will be upheld. Several Louisiana cases adhering to
the rule of strict construction of adoption legislation were cited
by the court in support of its position. 12 Of the cases cited, those
which are truly authority for the principle of strict construction
deal with the adoption of children and concern themselves with
the issue of proper consent of the natural parents.'3 In such
instances the courts have always applied the statutory provisions
strictly 4 and the rule of strict construction is justifiable. But
where the issue presented was other than that of proper consent
of the natural parents, the courts have been more liberal.15 It is
submitted that the cases the court cited are not good author-
12. Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 (1947) ; Owles v. Jackson, 199
La. 940, 7 So.2d 192 (1942) ; Hardy v. Mobley, 183 La. 668, 164 So. 621 (1935) ;
State ex rel. Monroe v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927) ; Succession of
Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267 (1927); In re Brand's Estate, 153 La. 195, 95
So. 603 (1923). Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917).
13. Further, although recent decisions have not questioned the strict con-
struction rule, it is submitted that this doctrine had a precarious beginning. Of
the cases cited in support of the rule in note 12 supra, only Hardy, Owles, and
Green actively enunciated the doctrine that adoption statutes, being in derogation
of the natural rights of the parties, are to be strictly construed in all instances.
Moreover, while Hardy paid lip service to the principle, the court nevertheless
upheld an adoption on a finding of concurrence of consent of the adopting
parents. Thus the rule of strict construction was not truly applied until Owle,
where the court supported its holding with an array of early cases which can
hardly be said to have invoked the doctrine.
14. See, e.g., Madere v. Long, 231 La. 498, 91 So.2d 771 (1956) ; Green v.
Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 (1947) ; Owles v. Jackson, 199 La. 940, 7 So.2d
192 (1942). In State ex rel. Monroe, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927) and
In re Brand's Estate, 153 La. 195, 95 So. 603 (1923), it was held that the proper
consent of both parents was essential to the validity of the adoption because the
legislature strictly provided for both parents to give their consent. Nevertheless,
these cases did not state that adoption statutes are to be strictly construed in all
instances because such statutes are in derogation of the natural rights of the
parties.
15. See Hardy v. Mobley, 183 La. 668, 164 So. 621 (1935), where the adoptive
parents did not both sign the act of adoption, but later made a formal acknowledg-
ment of the adoption. This was held to be adequate concurrence of consent
as required by Civil Code art. 214.
See also Succession of Dyer, 184 La. 251, 166 So. 68 (1936), where the parties
had followed the procedure set forth in La. Acts 1932, No. 46, of which a
pertinent part was declared unconstitutional. Nevertheless the court upheld the
adoption on the grounds that the parties had complied with the procedure provided
for in an earlier act which the 1932 statute had superseded. It seems doubtful
that any part of the earlier act was still effective after passage of the com-
prehensive act of 1932, since only one section of that act was held unconstitutional.
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ity for the instant case, for there was no need to guard the
natural parents' rights and no need for their consent. Only the
consent of the two parties to the act of adoption was necessary,
and this consent had been given.
Numerous decisions from common law jurisdictions ap-
plying the rule of strict construction to adoption statutes were
relied upon by the court. 6 All of these, however, are of doubt-
ful persuasive effect in Louisiana for various reasons. First,
it may be noted that it is the tradition in common law jurisdic-
tions that a statute changing the substantive common law is to
be strictly construed. 17  Such a rule is inapplicable in a civil law
jurisdiction having legislation as the foundation of its legal
order. Moreover, the court cited early Iowa and Texas cases
supporting the view that recordation is essential to the validity
of the adoption where the statute so provides ;18 but the wording
16. Abney v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393, 4 So. 757 (1887) ; In re Estate of
Taggart, 190 Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504 (1923) ; Monk v. McDaniel, 120 Ga. 480,
47 S.E. 931 (1904) ; Kennedy v. Borob, 226 Ill. 243, 80 N.E. 767 (1907) ; Morris
v. Trotter, 202 Iowa 232, 210 N.W. 131 (1926); Young v. McClannahan, 187
Iowa 1184, 175 N.W. 26 (1919) ; Webb v. McIntosh, 178 Iowa 156, 159 N.W.
637 (1916) ;Horner v. Merwell, 171 Iowa 660, 153 N.W. 331 (1915) ; Riley v.
McKinney, 167 Iowa 508, 149 N.W. 603 (1914); Lamb v. Morrow, 140 Iowa
89, 117 N.W. 1118 (1908) ; Sires v. Melvin, 135 Iowa 460, 113 N.W. 106 (1907) ;
Hopkins v. Antrobus, 120 Iowa 21, 94 N.W. 251 (1903) ; Bresser v. Saarman, 112
Iowa 720, 84 N.W. 920 (1901) ; McCollister v. Yard, 90 Iowa 621, 57 N.W. 447
(1894) ; Burger v. Frakes, 67 Iowa 460, 23 N.W. 746, 25 N.W. 735 (1885) ;
Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa 578, 9 N.W. 907 (1881) ; Gill v. Sullivan, 55 Iowa
341, 7 N.W. 586 (1880) ; Tyler v. Reynolds, 53 Iowa 146, 4 N.W. 902 (1880) ;
Long v. Hewitt, 44 Iowa 363 (1876) ; Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W.
455 (1913) ; Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 2 S.W. 372 (1886) ; Sanders v.
Lane, 227 S.W. 946 (Tex. Com. App. 1921) ; Powell v. Ott, 146 S.W. 1019 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912) ; J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Hooks, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 560,
106 S.W. 690 (1907) ; James v. James, 35 Wash. 650, 77 Pac. 1080 (1904).
17. See, e.g., Hughes v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 193, 211 P.2d 463 (1949)
In re Webb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P.2d 222 (1947) ; In re Newman, 88 Cal.
App. 186, 262 Pac. 1112 (1927) ; Adoption of vedl, 56 Abs. 231, 114 N.E.2d
311 (Ohio 1952) ; Dougherty's Adoption, 358 Pa. 620, 58 A.2d 77 (1948);
Petition of Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d 875 (1956) ; In re Smith's
Estate, 49 Wash.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550 (1956). See also CRAWFORD, TnE CON-
STRUCTION OF STATUTES § 248 (1940).
18. Young v. McClannahan, 187 Iowa 1184, 175 N.W. 26 (1919) ; Webb v.
McIntosh, 178 Iowa 156, 159 N.W. 637 (1916) ; Homer v. Maxwell, 171 Iowa
660, 153 N.W. 331 (1915) ; Riley v. McKinney, 167 Iowa 508, 149 N.W. 603
(1914) ; Lamb v. Morrow, 140 Iowa 89, 117 N.W. 11.18 (1908) ; Sires v. Melvin,
135 Iowa 460, 113 N.W. 106 (1907) ; Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa 579, 9 N.W.
907 (1881) ; Gill v. Sullivan, 55 Iowa 341, 7 N.W. 586 (1880) ; Tyler v. Reynolds,
53 Iowa 146, 4 N.W. 902 (1880) ; Long v. Hewitt, 44 Iowa 363 (1876) ; Sanders
v. Lane, 227 S.W. 946 (Tex. Com. App. 1921) ; Powell v. Ott, 146 S.W. 1019
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; James v. James, 35 Wash. 650, 77 Pac. 1080 (1904)
(applying Iowa law). Also cited as authority for the same holding were Evans's
Estate, 47 Pa. Super. 196 (1911), which depended upon Iowa decisions for its
holding, and Monk v. McDaniel, 120 Ga. 480, 47 S.E. 931 (1904), the holding
of which has never been cited in any other Georgia case, either approvingly or
disapprovingly.
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of those statutes clearly compelled the result. 19 Even so, those
jurisdictions have avoided possible injustices by applying the
doctrine of equitable adoption, i.e., enforcing the null adoption
as though it were valid.20
Iowa cases were emphasized by the court as applying the
rule of strict construction of adoption statutes ;21 but these were
all early decisions, and the rule has been expressly rejected by
more recent Iowa cases advocating liberal construction. 22  Many
of the other cases cited were inapplicable for other reasons.23
In spite of their traditional attitude toward legislation,
common law jurisdictions have been retreating from their former
position concerning the construction of adoption statutes. The
19. The Iowa Civil Code (1873) sets forth in mandatory language the
procedure to be followed in order to adopt a child. Section 2308 states in part:
"Such instrument in writing shall also be signed by the person adopting, and shall
,be acknowledged by all the parties thereto; . . . and shall be recorded in the
recorder's office." Then section 2309 states: "Upon the execution, acknowledg-
ment and filing for record of such instrument, the rights, duties and relations
between the parents and child by adoption shall thereafter . . . be the same that
exists by law between parent and child by lawful birth." See Bresser v. Saarman,
112 Iowa 720, 722, 84 N.W. 920 (1901).
TEXAS REV. CIVIL STAT. art. 1 (1911) states: "Any person wishing to adopt
another as his legal heir may do so by filing . . . a statement in writing by him
signed and authenticated or acknowledged ....... See Sanders v. Lane, 227 S.W.
946 (Tex. Com. App. 1921).
There is yet another reason why the requirement of recordation is more
essential to the adoption in the above jurisdictions than it should be in Louisiana.
In Iowa and Texas, as well as in some other jurisdictions, adoptions could be
effected by a private contract, which necessitated there be some reliable source
of proof. In Louisiana the requirement of a notarial act ascertains the intent
of the parties and makes a public official a witness to the act, thus largely
satisfying the necessity for proof.
20. See, e.g., In re Painter's Estate, 246 Iowa 622, 67 N.W.2d 617 (1954)
Vermillion v. Sikora, 227 Iowa 786, 289 N.W. 27 (1939) ; Horner v. Maxwell,
171 Iowa 660, 153 N.W. 331 (1915) ; Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d
72 (1934) ; Guy v. Jones, 132 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
21. See, e.g., Lamb v. Morrow, 140 Iowa 89, 117 N.W. 1118 (1908) ; Sires
v. Melvin, 135 Iowa 460, 113 N.W. 106 (1907) ; Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa
579, 9 N.W. 907 (1881) ; Gill v. Sullivan, 55 Iowa 341, 7 N.W. 586 (1880);
Tyler v. Reynolds, 53 Iowa 146, 4 N.W. 902 (1880) ; Long v. Hewitt, 44 Iowa
363 (1876).
22. See Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 961, 14 N.W.2d 742 (1944) ; Shaw v.
Scott, 217 Iowa 1259, 252 N.W. 237 (1934) ; In re Estate of Wadst, 209 Iowa
1200, 229 N.W. 835 (1930) ; cf. Seibert v. Seibert, 170 Iowa 561, 153 N.W. 160
(1915) ; Sires v. Melvin, 135 Iowa 460, 113 N.W. 106 (1907).
23. Abney v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393, 4 So. 757 (1887) (advocated substantial
compliance with the statute) ; Kennedy v. Boroh, 226 Ill. 243, 80 N.E. 767 (1907)
(required substantial compliance) ; Morris v. Trotter, 202 Iowa 232, 210 N.W.
131 (1926) (oral contract to adopt held unenforceable) ; Hopkins v. Antrobus,
120 Iowa 21 (1903) (question of proper consent of natural parents) ; Burger v.
Frakes, 67 Iowa 460, 23 N.W. 746, 25 N.W. 735 (1885) (question of consent) ;
Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913) (private contract of adop-
tion upheld as a contract) ; Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 2 S.W. 372 (1886) (no
question of the validity of the adoption itself) ; J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v.
Hooks, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 106 S.W. 690 (1907) (parole evidence allowed
to prove act of adoption where no record thereof was found).
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great weight of modern authority appears to favor a more
liberal view.2 4 Presently, the construction given to adoption
statutes in other states can be roughly classified into five
categories: (1) liberal construction,2 5 (2) substantial compliance
with the statute,26 (3) compliance with the essentials of the
statute,27 (4) a construction to favor the child and carry out
the legislative purpose, 2 and (5) strict construction. 9 The
rule of strict construction clearly appears to be a minority view
in the United States today.30
The legislature has provided a means of adopting majors. It
should not be the purpose of the court to defeat the legislative
purpose, but rather to sustain it. This decision undoubtedly
works an injustice upon one who lived for nearly two years
with the deceased as her legal son. But more significantly, it
extends a poorly founded rule of law3 ' well beyond its scope
in any prior Louisiana case. It is the opinion of the writer
that the rule of strict construction should be narrowly limited
in its application rather than extended to catch such irregularities
as that of the instant case.
Scotty G. Rozas
24. See notes 25, 26, 27, 28 infra.
25. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562, 354
P.2d 18 (1960) ; Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291, 73 S.E. 2d 572 (1952);
Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 961, 14 N.W.2d 742 (1944); In re Goodwin'a
Estate, 147 Me. 237, 86 A.2d 88 (1952) ; In re Adoption of Moffett, 5 N.J. Super.
82, 68 A.2d 279 (1949) ; Conville v. Bakke, 400 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1964) ; Stinson
v. Rasco, 316 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ; Taylor v. Waddoups, 121 Utah,
279, 241 P.2d 157 (1952).
26. See, e.g., Petition of Simaner, 16 Ill. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 419 (1957)
Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84, 45 Pac. 71 (1896) ; Davis v. McCraw, 206 Mass.
294, 92 N.E. 332 (1910) ; In re Jordet's Petition, 248 Minn. 433, 80 N.W.2d 642
(1957) ; In re C., C., & C., 380 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App. 1964) ; Lacher v. Venus,
177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922) ; Hiatt v. LaFever, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d
214 (1951) ; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 Pac. 23 (1893).
27. See, e.g., In re Taggart's Estate, 190 Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504 (1923)
Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 125 N.E.2d 446 (1955) ; Glansman v. Ledbetter,
190 Ind. 505, 130 N.E. 230 (1921) ; Sklaroff v. Stevens, 76 S.C. 736, 120 A.2d
694 (1956).
28. See, e.g., Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal.2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954) ; I% re
McKeag's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039 (1903) ; Shepherd v. Murphy, 332
Mo. 1178, 61 SW.2d 746 (1933) ; Hahn v. Sorgen, 50 N.M. 83, 171 P.2d 308
(1946) ; EB parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713 (1959) ; Woodall
Y. Schmudlach, 299 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
29. See note 17 supra.
30. Certainly, where there is no question of proper consent of the natural
parents, a substantial majority of jurisdictions would apply a liberal construction
to the adoption statutes. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 13 supra.
